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The most significant foreign affairs cases that the Supreme
Court has decided—including, among others, Youngstown Sheet &
Tube v. Sawyer,1 United States v. Curtiss-Wright,2 and Zivotofsky v.
Kerry3—have substantial effects at home. These canonical cases fix
the boundaries of power between the coordinate branches of
government. In this Essay, the Author wants to start a discussion
that concerns one underexplored attribute of these cases:
Although these cases adjudicate authority between the President
and Congress, they are litigated between the Solicitor General and
private parties.
The Supreme Court is limited by Article III of the Constitution
to resolving “Cases” or “Controversies.” 4 When the Court
adjudicates foreign affairs issues, those issues are litigated as
opposed to negotiated, administered, or legislated. There is a
judicial record. There are briefs and arguments. And, critically,
there are parties. Contrast the Judiciary’s limited set of decisionmaking tools and processes with the other branches’ much broader
toolkits. The Executive Branch includes the State Department (and
its ambassadors and foreign liaisons) and numerous sources of
intelligence (including agencies housed within the Executive
Branch). The Executive Branch can consult with foreign heads of
state and multinational bodies. And it can include new intelligence
* Academic Fellow, Columbia Fellow, Columbia Law School. I would like to thank the
Fordham International Law Journal for the invitation to participate in this Symposium. I
would also like to thank Brian Richardson and the participants in the A&F Workshop at
Columbia Law School.
1. 343 U.S. 579, 634-55 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring) (setting the framework to
adjudicate power disputes between President and Congress).
2. 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (establishing the President is the “sole organ” in foreign
affairs).
3. 576 U.S. 1059 (2015) (holding Congress may not qualify the President’s exclusive
recognition power).
4. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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and information as it becomes available. Likewise, the Legislative
Branch has access to intelligence and oversight and its
decisionmakers can consult new evidence and keep up with
foreign developments. By contrast, courts—including the Supreme
Court—are constrained by the record and briefs that the parties
put before them. Here, the Author would like to probe the role of
one particular party, the Solicitor General: the officer charged with
representing the “United States” in the Court.5
Often referred to as the “Tenth Justice,”6 the Solicitor General
is an integrated thread in the Supreme Court’s fabric. The Solicitor
General has a physical presence—her own office—located inside
the Court.7 The Court will often call for the Solicitor General’s views
at the certiorari stage and will permit the Solicitor General to
participate at oral argument as the most frequent amicus curiae.8
Scholars have written about the special status that the Solicitor
General enjoys. 9 The Office’s success at the Court is welldocumented and unmatched at both the certiorari and merits
stages.10 Some attribute this high degree of success to the special
care that the Solicitor General exercises in carrying out her role.11
The Office employs a rigorous vetting process before choosing to
petition for certiorari, and those who craft the briefs—the Solicitor
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (stating “except where the Attorney General in a particular
case directs otherwise, the Attorney General and the Solicitor General shall conduct and
argue suits and appeals in the Supreme Court . . . in which the United States is interested.”).
The Attorney General, in turn, has delegated authority to the Solicitor General by
regulation. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.20.
6. See generally LINCOLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE
RULE OF LAW (1987).
7. It is quite remarkable for one branch to have a physical space within another
branch of government. Indeed, the only other is the Vice President’s office in the Senate.
8. See Dr. Adam Feldman, Amicus Oral Argument Participation Over Time, EMPIRICAL
SCOTUS (Jan. 4, 2017), https://empiricalscotus.com/2017/01/04/amicus-oralargument/ [https://perma.cc/UAH8-2KTU].
9. See generally REBECCA MAE SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS OF LAW
(1992); Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General Control Over
Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255, 260 (1994); Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme
Court Support for the Solicitor General: The Effect of Presidential Appointments, 43 W.
POL. Q. 137, 147-50 (1990).
10. See, e.g., SALOKAR, supra note 9, at 14-32 (collecting data at certiorari and merits
stages).
11. Seth P. Waxman, “Presenting the Case of the United States As It Should Be”: The
Solicitor General in Historical Context, Address to the Supreme Court Historical Society, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUST.
(June
1,
1998),
https://www.justice.gov/osg/about-office
[https://perma.cc/5UVQ-4Z57].
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General, the Principal Deputy Solicitor General, three career
deputies, and sixteen assistants—are some of the most seasoned
Supreme Court litigators in the country.12 Even the bindings of the
Solicitor General’s arguments set it apart from the pack. When
private parties file briefs they are either blue (petitioner), red
(respondent), or green (amicus).13 The Solicitor General’s brief is
always gray.14 It appears to be literally neutral.
The Solicitor General is not neutral, however. It represents the
interests of the “United States.” 15 Who or what is the “United
States”? In United States v. Providence Journal the Supreme Court
answered precisely that question. 16 In a case with a complex
procedural posture, a special prosecutor representing the Judicial
Branch in a contempt proceeding sought permission from the
Solicitor General to petition for certiorari, which the Solicitor
General denied. 17 Nonetheless, the special prosecutor petitioned
for certiorari and the Court decided the threshold question of
whether the special prosecutor was permitted to bring this suit in
light of the fact that the Solicitor General is the only officer who can
litigate a case before the Court “in which the United States is
interested.” 18 Although both the special prosecutor and the
Solicitor General argued that this was not a case “in which the
United States is interested,” the Court found that the Article III
judicial power at stake was very much part of the sovereign United
States. 19 “It seems to be elementary that even when exercising
distinct and jealously separated powers, the three branches are but
‘co-ordinate parts of one government[,]’” and so, the Solicitor

12. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (theorizing the advantages that repeat
players enjoy in litigation). Indeed, some in the Office have argued over a hundred cases
before the Supreme Court.
13. U.S. Supreme Court – Booklet Format Specification Chart, SUPREME COURT,
https://www.supremecourt.gov/casehand/USSC%20-%20BookletFormat%20Specification%20Chart%202019.pdf [https://perma.cc/56AB-SH9U] (last
visited May 1, 2020).
14. So close is the working relationship between the Solicitor General’s Office and the
Supreme Court that the Supreme Court’s chart describing to parties how briefs should be
filed does not even include directions for the Solicitor General’s briefs. See id.
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 518(a) (providing statutory text and regulatory provisions).
16. United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 701 (1988).
17. Id. at 698-99.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 518(a).
19. Providence Journal, 485 U.S. at 700-03.
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General represents all of those interests, not just the Executive
Branch’s interests.20
The ubiquity of the Solicitor General’s participation in public
law cases carries the specter of a distorting effect in the
development of public law: the Solicitor General can coordinate its
positions over a long period of time, it can settle hard cases or
confess error in cases with bad facts, and it can help craft the
record that ultimately comes before the Court.21 But the potential
distorting effect of its participation is even more concerning in the
foreign affairs arena, particularly when considered together with
doctrines of deference to executive branch expertise.22 Although
the Solicitor General aspires “to ensure that the United States
speaks in court with a single voice – a voice that speaks on behalf
of the rule of law[,]” 23 when there is an inter-branch conflict—
often taking the form of the President versus Congress—the
Solicitor General almost always represents the President. For
example, in Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer—the canonical
decision setting out an adjudicative framework for executive
power in foreign affairs—Secretary of Commerce Sawyer (i.e., the
Executive Branch) was represented by the Solicitor General. 24
Congress’ interest in its statute, by contrast, was represented by
the private petitioners, Youngstown Sheet and Tube, and others.25
One of the modern cases concerning the relationship between
Congress and the President in foreign affairs matters was
commenced by a private citizen. Menachim Zivotofsky is a US
citizen born in Jerusalem. 26 In December 2002, Zivotofsky’s
20. Id. at 701 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406
(1928)).
21. David M. Rosenzweig, Confession of Error in the Supreme Court by the Solicitor
General, 82 GEO. L.J. 2079 (1993); Neal K. Katyal, The Solicitor General and Confession of
Error, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3027 (2013); Z. Payvand Ahdout, Direct Collateral Review, 121
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming) (chronicling specific examples where the Solicitor General
coordinates a position over time with an apparent strategic aim). At times, it is not the
Solicitor General that directly controls these decisions, but other actors within the
Department of Justice or Executive Branch.
22 . See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (deferring to Executive’s
national security expertise).
23. See Waxman, supra note 11.
24. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 581.
25. See Brief for Plaintiff Companies at 18-26, Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1953) (Nos. 744, 745), 1952 WL 82173 (arguing that Congress provided a
remedy in the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947).
26. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 192 (2012).
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mother filed an application for a Consular Report of Birth Abroad
and sought to obtain a US Passport for Zivotofsky, listing his
birthplace as “Jerusalem, Israel.” 27 Diplomatic officials informed
Zivotofsky’s mother that State Department policy required them to
record “Jerusalem” as the place of birth (without reference to
Israel). 28 This State Department policy, ostensibly crafted to
navigate Middle East tensions, violated Congress’ word in the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act, which required the Secretary
of State to list the birthplace as “Israel” if so requested. 29
Zivotofsky’s parents thus initiated suit seeking an order
compelling the State Department to identify Zivotofsky’s
birthplace as “Jerusalem, Israel” pursuant to the Act. 30 The
fundamental question presented by this dispute was whether the
Foreign Relations Authorization Act impermissibly infringes upon
the President’s power to recognize foreign states. Congress’
passport power—not enumerated, but historically exercised—and
the President’s recognition power—not enumerated, but derived
from the authority to receive foreign officers—clashed.
The first time the suit came to the Court, styled Zivotofsky v.
Clinton, the primary question presented was whether the case
presented a non-justiciable political question. 31 The D.C. Circuit
below relied on the theory that because the Constitution grants the
President the exclusive authority to recognize foreign states, the
Judiciary cannot review those decisions.32 In an 8-1 decision, the
Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the dispute was indeed
justiciable. The Court reasoned, in part, that although the
recognition power belongs to the President alone, interpreting the
scope of the recognition power—an exercise in constitutional
interpretation—does not belong to the President alone.33

27. Id. at 192-93.
28. Id. at 193.
29. See Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228,
§ 214(d), 116 Stat. 1350, 1366 (2002) (mandating “[f]or purposes of the registration of
birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of a United States citizen born
in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall, upon the request of the citizen or the citizen’s
legal guardian, record he birth place as Israel”).
30. Zivotofsky, 566 U.S. at 193.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 193-94.
33. Id. at 201.
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In 2014, the case returned to the Court, this time styled
Zivotofsky v. Kerry.34 Briefing and argument centered on the clash
between Congress and the President, not on Zivotofsky’s injury.35
The opinion hardly mentions Zivotofsky other than to evaluate the
arguments presented in his brief. Curiously, however, in spite of
the fact that the House of Representatives and the Senate each filed
amici curiae briefs, the Court assessed the arguments put forth in
Zivotofsky’s brief, not those advanced by Congress. 36 Ultimately,
the Court conceded that legal precedents did not resolve the scope
of the President’s Recognition Power. But the confluence of
precedent and historical practice—including historical
Congressional acquiesce—dictated the result. “[T]he exclusive
recognition power is essential to the conduct of Presidential duties.
The formal act of recognition is an executive power that Congress
may not qualify.”37
Zivotofsky highlights the asymmetry between the Executive
and Legislative Branches in foreign affairs cases before the Court.
Although the suit was initiated by a private individual, by the time
the Court decided the merits of the dispute, the only question was
the appropriate division of authority between Congress and the
President.38 Yet Congress has no formal representative before the
Court. Each house of Congress filed an amicus brief, but neither
house of Congress participated at oral argument.39 By contrast, the
Solicitor General filed a merits brief and argued before the Court.40
34. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
35. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 576 U.S. 1059
(2015) (No. 10-699).
36. 135 S. Ct. at 2103-04 (stating that the sole exception is a single citation to the
Congressional briefs in the section where the Court evaluates the Passport Power
arguments in Zivotofsky’s brief).
37. Id. at 2081-82.
38. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 576 U.S. 1059 (2015) (No.
10-699) (presenting the question “Whether a federal statute that directs the Secretary of
State, on request, to record the birthplace of an American citizen born in Jerusalem as born
in ‘Israel’ on a Consular Report of Birth Abroad and on a United States passport is
unconstitutional on the ground that the statute ‘impermissibly infringes on the President’s
exercise of the recognition power reposing exclusively in him’”).
39. See Brief for Members of the US House of Representatives as Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1059 (2015) (No. 13-628); Brief for the
US Senate as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitoner, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1059 (2015)
(No. 13-628).
40. See Brief for the Respondent, Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. 1059 (2015) (No. 13628).
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The opinion for the Court, moreover, chronicles the delicate story
of Jerusalem’s status, relying principally on presidential actions
and statements, not on Congressional action.41
In a case-or-controversy system where the adjudication of
separation-of-powers disputes are litigated between private
parties and the Solicitor General, the specter of distortion is real.
There is a difference between participating as a formal party and
availing oneself of other modes of participation. Of course,
Congress and its members have the opportunity to file amici curiae
briefs with the Supreme Court to advocate their views. Without
unanimity among its members, however, Congressional amici
briefs may appear partisan and therefore be less effective. Even
where Congress is unanimous—as in Zivotofksy—the fact that the
Executive is a formal party allows it to enjoy a spectrum of
authority and autonomy that Congress does not. The Executive can
settle cases, moot issues, and thus can effectively prevent the Court
from ruling in a particular case. It can also be strategic at the
certiorari stage, urging the Court to take the case with the best facts
or the best law for the Executive. Most fundamentally, although a
private party may be aligned with Congress in some broad sense,
that does not mean that a private party will advocate for
Congressional authority with the same zeal that the Solicitor
General does for Executive authority. The fact that the private
party’s interest is aligned with Congress’ is merely incidental to
winning. Still further, the parties themselves are responsible for
creating the factual and legal record on which the Supreme Court
ultimately rules. Even before the case is formally in the Solicitor
General’s hands, the Department of Justice participates and can
coordinate with other parts of the Executive Branch to make
strategic litigation decisions. Deciding whether authority formally
belongs to the President or Congress may come down to whether
a case was well litigated by a private party. For instance, a private
party may formally waive, or more likely, unintentionally forfeit
winning legal arguments by failing to make them below.42
When viewed through this lens, the decisions that set the
foundation for the separation of powers and balance of powers
among our coordinate branches of government—including
41. See 135 S. Ct. at 2081-83 (Part I).
42. See, e.g., Am. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Chi. v. Haroco, Inc., 473 U.S. 606, 608 (1985)
(declining to resolve argument that petitioners failed to make in court below).
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Youngstown, Curtiss-Wright, and Zivotofsky—are litigated from a
place of asymmetry. The Court is sensitive to this asymmetry, but
it is sensitive in ad hoc ways.43 Where Congress has filed its own
brief, the Court sometimes allows Congress to participate at
argument. 44 At other times, Congressional amici do not
participate.45
There is further reason to be sensitive to this asymmetry at
the present moment. In the domestic sphere, there has been cause
to question the Solicitor General’s neutrality. Some have been
particularly skeptical of arguments made by the Solicitor General
before the Court and have questioned the Solicitor General’s use of
procedural mechanisms to circumvent ordinary review. 46 The
Solicitor General has filed an unprecedented number of motions
seeking Supreme Court review without traditional appellate
review. 47 “Claiming one emergency after another, the [Solicitor
General] has recently sought stays in an unprecedented number of
cases . . . .” 48 At least one justice has seen reason to be more
skeptical of the Solicitor General’s claims of urgency.49
It is therefore an apt moment to question the role of litigants
before the Court. The Author would like to close by laying out an
analytical research agenda to probe the role of the Solicitor General
in foreign affairs disputes that go to the fundamental division of
43. In the context of the Alien Tort Statute, the Court was particularly skeptical of the
Solicitor General when its positions changed between administrations. See, e.g., Transcript
of Oral Reargument at 34, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2012) (No.
10-1491).
44. For example, when the Solicitor General declined to defend the Defense Against
Marriage Act, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (“BLAG”) of the United States House of
Representatives voted to intervene in the suit and litigated the case at the Supreme Court
on Congress’ behalf. BLAG participated at oral argument, yet there was a substantial
question whether the Solicitor General’s decision not to defend the statute deprived the
Court of jurisdiction. See generally United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). Indeed,
in assessing the prudential considerations that went to Congress’ standing in the case, the
Court considered “the extent to which adversarial presentation of the issues is assured by
the participation of amici curiae prepared to defend with vigor the constitutionality of the
legislative act.” 570 U.S. at 760.
45. In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 576 U.S. at 1059, each House of Congress filed an amicus
brief, yet neither House of Congress participated at argument.
46. Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV.
123, 159 (2019).
47. Id. at 132-52.
48. Wolf v. Cook Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 681, 683 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
49. Id. (“And with each successive application, of course, its cries of urgency ring
increasingly hollow”).
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authority between Congress and the President. Should the Solicitor
General be accorded inchoate deference and respect as a repeat
player in these disputes? How can the Court assess when the
Solicitor General represents the views of the United States without
first deciding to whom the authority at issue belongs? Should the
Court formally welcome an advocate to represent the
Congressional interest in these disputes? Should Congress
statutorily create a “Congressional Solicitor General” to represent
its interests before the Supreme Court? Would such an office
further entrench the Solicitor General’s representation of the
President in these disputes? Of course, these will raise threshold
jurisdictional questions about Congressional standing and political
question doctrine, which the Court has yet to resolve. 50 But the
resolution of these questions may affect the balance of authority
between the three branches.

50. For interesting assessments of these issues, see, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson,
Congressional Standing to Sue: The Role of Courts and Congress in U.S. Constitutional
Democracy, 93 IND. L.J. 845 (2018); Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited)
Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571 (2014); Jonathan Remy Nash, A
Functional Theory of Congressional Standing, 144 MICH. L. REV. 339 (2015).
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